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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1982
by
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1982 is the tenth in a series of articles
published in the Akron Law Review. With the inauguration of The Tax
Journal, I considered it the most appropriate publication for the 1982
Developments. In keeping with the prior format, I have limited the scope of
this survey to substantive developments in income taxation.
Due to its tremendous ramifications, a separate section on the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) is included in this year's developments.
To minimize lead time between research and publication, I engaged the
most able assistance of second-year law students. Without their substantial
contributions and complete dedication this article would not have been possible.
In recognition of their efforts, I thank the foliowing students for their efforts
in researching, writing and compiling this article:
Raymond J. Garcia Project Coordinator
B. Carl Conley Tax Articles Editors
Maryanne R. Rackoff Akron Law Review
Jon F. Carine
Lisa A. Gialdini
Darlene M. Vlahos
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I. SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Corporations: Brother-Sister Control Groups
In United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,' the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to settle a conflict among the circuit courts' regarding the
Treasury's interpretation of the statutory term "brother-sister controlled
group." 3
The significant historical details involved two companies: Vogel Fertilizer
Co. and Vogel Popcorn Co. Vogel Fertilizer Co. had only common stock which
was owned by Arthur Vogel (77.4907o) and R. Crain (22.51 o). Vogel Popcorn
Co. was owned by Arthur Vogel (more than 80%) and the Alex Vogel Family
Trust. During the tax years of 1973, 1974 and 1975, Vogel Fertilizer did not
claim a full surtax exemption on its tax returns, believing that a full exemp-
tion was prohibited by the Treasury Regulations. 4 Subsequently, in a separate
'102 S. Ct. 821 (1982).
2Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980), Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
614 F.2d 336 (2d Ci. 1980), Fairfax Auto Parts of North Virginia v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th
Cir. 1977), T. L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977).
I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2). All subsequent code citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended.
4Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3).
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case, the Tax Court held the Treasury Regulation invalid' and Vogel Fertilizer
filed claims for refunds. The basis of Vogel's refund claims was that Vogel
Popcorn and Vogel Fertilizer were not members of a "brother-sister controll-
ed group" and were therefore each entitled to a full surtax exemption for the
years in question.
The Court of Claims in Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner6 held for
Vogel, determining that the Treasury Regulation7 was invalid because it in-
cluded, for purposes of the 80% requirement, stock owned by a stockholder
who had shares in only one corporation of the alleged controlled group.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Court of Claims, rejecting the "singly
or in combination" provision of the Treasury Regulation.' The Court found
that the statute9 required that both the 80% and the 50% requirement be fulfilled
by the same indivisible group of five or fewer persons. Therefore, the Court
held that "[t]he same '5' or fewer individuals cannot be said to control 80%
of both Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel Popcorn because Crain owns no stock in
Vogel Popcorn and therefore his 22.51 % of Vogel Fertilizer cannot be added
to Vogel's 77.49% of that corporation to satisfy 1563(a)(2)(A)."'
Thus, in order to determine if the relationship between two or more cor-
porations satisfies the test of a "brother-sister controlled group,"II a person's
stock ownership may be taken into account for satisfaction of the 80% re-
quirement, but only if he or she is a shareholder in all of the corporations within
the alleged controlled group. The Court's conclusion requires that there be one
indivisible group of shareholders who control 80% or more of the corpora-
tions involved. Based on the Court's conclusion, the 80% requirement is now
the primary basis for determining whether two or more corporations are
represented by the same financial interest, and the 50% requirement is used
solely to measure common ownership.
The Supreme Court invalidated the Treasury Regulation 2 only to the ex-
tent that it called for the counting of the stock of a shareholder, for purposes
of the 80% test, who owned stock in only one of the alleged controlled group
corporations. The remainder of the Regulation remains valid and must be
adhered to in all future transactions.
By resolving the scope of the 80% test, the Court has permitted practi-
'Fairfax Auto Parts of Northern Virginia, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 789 (1976).
'225 Ct. CI. ., 634 F.2d 497 (1980).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(2).
8id.
'I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2).
10102 S. Ct. 821, 826 (1982).
"I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3).
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tioners to focus on the tax planning aspects of the brother-sister corporate struc-
ture with renewed confidence in the technical requirements.
B. Gift Tax: Net Gift Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court decision in Deidrich v. Commissioner'3
finally settled the controversy surrounding the "Net Gift" doctrine. The term
"Net Gift" refers to a gift conditioned on the donee paying the donor's gift
tax. Prior to Diedrich, conflict existed among the circuit courts regarding the
income tax consequences of net gifts to the donor. In Diedrich, the Court, much
to the chagrin of the taxpayer, upheld the position advocated by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS): that a "Net Gift" is in reality part gift and part tax-
able sale, despite the donative intent of the donor.
In several early "Net Gift" cases," the Tax Court consistently rejected
the IRS's position upheld in Deidrich. The basis for the Tax Court's rejection
was that it refused to find that the donor lacked the donative intent simply
because the gift was conditioned on the donee paying the gift tax. By focusing
on the donor's intent, the Tax Court had little difficulty rejecting the IRS's
part-sale/part-gift theory.
With its decision in Turner v. Commissioner,'5 the Tax Court unequivocally
rejected the IRS's position regarding "Net Gifts." The Turner decision held
that where a donor gives property conditioned upon the donee paying the gift
tax, such a transaction does not constitute a sale by the donor for the amount
of the gift tax. Turner was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.' 6 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits also rejected the part-sale/part-gift
theory. ' I
The Turner line of cases was weakened by two subsequent decisions. In
Johnson v. Commissioner'8 the appellate court for the first time accepted the
IRS's part-sale/part-gift theory. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the
Johnson'9 decision but rejected the part-sale/part-gift theory. Instead, the appel-
late court based its decision on Crane v. Commissioner° and Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, I' thereby not actually overruling Turner but significantly
limiting its application. The second case which served to weaken Turner was
the Second Circuit case of Estate of Levine v. Commissioner."2 In Levine, the
1102 S. Ct. 2414 (1982).
'Lingo v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 436 (1954), Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1958).
"549 T.C. 356 (1968).
"Commissioner v. Turner, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
'Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978), Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 694
(5th Cir. 1972).
"Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973).
"1495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974).
2331 U.S. 1 (1947).
279 U.S. 716 (1929).
22634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. I
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Court based its decision on Johnson rather than openly contradicting Turner,
although in fact the Levine decision was exactly the opposite of Turner.
With Johnson and Levine as support, the Eighth Circuit in Diedrich3 flatly
rejected the Turner line of cases. In Diedrich, the court upheld the part-sale/part-
gift theory advanced by the IRS. Based on the conflict among the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Diedrich case in order to put the "Net
Gift" dispute to rest.
The Supreme Court upheld the position advocated by the IRS, holding
that "the transfer is treated as if the donor sells the property to the donee for
less than the fair market value. The 'sale' price is the amount necessary to
discharge the gift tax indebtedness; the balance of the value of the transferred
property is treated as a gift." Thus, taxable gifts will result to the donor to
the extent that the gift tax paid by the donee exceeds the donor's adjusted basis
in the gift property.
Based on the part-sale/part-gift theory, the donee will take his or her cost
as the basis in the property, the donee's cost being the amount of gift tax paid.
The donee's holding period for such property remains unclear. However, if
the same reasoning for determining basis is utilized, then the donee probably
will not be permitted to tack the donor's holding period.
Finally, although the Diedrich decision significantly lessens the advantages
of giving away highly appreciated property, the gift tax advantage remains in-
tact. The value of the gift for gift tax purposes is calculated by reducing the
fair market value of the gift by the amount of gift tax paid by the donee. In
order to perform this calculation properly, the algebraic formula established
by the IRS must be employed.24 It should be noted that the donee cannot assume
any of the donor's gift tax liability until the donor's unified credit has been
exhausted, 5 which may pose serious practical problems in a net-gift situation.
II. OIL AND GAS
A. Intangible Drilling Costs (IDC)
Intangible Drilling Costs are those costs incurred by the operator of an
oil, gas or geothermal well which may be deducted as a current expense rather
than capitalized. This is not to suggest that the operator must expense such
costs; the expensing of such costs is at the election of the operator. The operator,
of course, may simply elect not to expense the costs and may instead charge
them to the capital account and recover the costs through depreciation or deple-
tion. However, once the election to expense the intangible drilling costs is made,
2643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981).
24 tentative gift tax = actual gift tax
1 + donor's tax rate
2'Rev. Rul. 223, 1981-2 C.B. 189.
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it is binding upon the operator for all future years. It should be noted that
if the operator does elect to expense the intangible drilling costs, recapture of
some amounts of such costs may be required upon disposition of the well.26
The authority which permits the taxpayer operator to elect to expense intangi-
ble drilling costs is IRC section 263(c); however, this section does not establish
what costs constitute intangible drilling costs.
The Treasury Regulations 27 and case law28 will determine which costs are
intangible drilling costs. The Treasury Regulations provide a number of ex-
amples of the types of costs that may be capitalized or expensed at the election
of the operator. Such costs include "wage, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.,
incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells
for the production of oil or gas." Also included are "the costs to operators
of any drilling or development work ... done for them by contractors under
any form of contract including turnkey contracts." 29 The Tax Court has ar-
ticulated four criteria which will qualify an expenditure to be expensed rather
than capitalized:
(1) the taxpayer must hold an operating or working interest in the pro-
perty being developed; (2) the costs in question must relate to the develop-
ment of the property in which the taxpayer has a working or operating
interest; (3) the nature of the expenditure must fall within the definitional
guidelines provided by § 1.612-4(a), Income Tax Regs.; and (4) the tax
payment or incurrence of the costs must occur sufficiently early in the
development stages so that the taxpayer is exposed to the unknown risks
of development.3"
These four criteria in conjunction with the Treasury Regulations form an ex-
cellent tool for analyzing an expenditure to determine if it qualifies as an in-
tangible drilling cost.
When a well is owned by more than one individual, the Treasury Regula-
tions are somewhat rigid regarding the deductibility of intangible drilling costs.
Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4(a)(3) provides that when there are co-owners
of a working interest in an oil or gas well and one of the co-owners pays for
a greater portion of the intangible drilling cost than his or her proportionate
share of the property, that owner will not be permitted to expense the entire
amount of such costs currently. The co-owner who paid the IDC is required
to capitalize that portion of the costs which are not attributable to his or her
fractional share of the well. In order to circumvent this requirement and in-
sure current expensing of 100 percent of the intangible drilling costs, taxpayers
26I.R.C. § 1.612-4(a)(1).
2
'Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a).
2 Straplings Building Materials v. Commissioner T.C.M. (P-H) 79.4 (1982).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a).
'
0T.C.M. (P-H) 79.4 (1982).
[Vol. IAKRON TAX JOURNAL
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form operating partnerships under state law or other arrangements recognized
as partnerships by the IRS.
A brief summary of the facts presented in a recent Technical Advice
Memorandum are as follows: (1) B and C purchased an interest in an oil and
gas lease which entitled them to a 75 percent interest in the production. (2)
Subsequently the parties entered into a joint venture with A, whereby A agreed
to equip and drill an unstated number of wells. (3) In return for his services
and $15,000, A was to receive 70 percent of B and C's interest in the produc-
tion of wells for which A provided services. (4) The parties agreed to treat the
joint venture as a partnership for federal-income tax purposes. (5) The agree-
ment did not provide for the creation of "capital accounts" reflecting the li-
quidation rights of the parties. (6) Regarding the deductions for expenses, the
agreement provided that these would be allocated to the party paying such ex-
penses. (7) It should be noted at this point that, by the terms of the joint ven-
ture agreement, A was paying all the intangible drilling costs.
Upon review of the partnership's federal income tax return, the IRS agent
proposed (among other proposals) a partial capitalization (30%) of the intangible
drilling costs paid by A. The IRS Agent felt that the intangible drilling costs,
pursuant to Treasury Regulation § 1.612-4(a)(3), should be expensed only to
the extent of A's 70 percent interest in the partnership. The basis of the agent's
argument was that the 100 percent allocation of the intangible drilling costs
to A lacked "substantial economic effect." 31
Upon review the National Office determined that the 100 percent alloca-
tion to A did have a "substantial economic effect" and was therefore permitted.
It should be noted that the Service permitted the full allocation of the intangi-
ble drilling costs based upon the provisions of the partnership agreement, despite
the fact that the agreement did not provide for formal "capital accounts."
Thus, it remains possible to allocate full current expensing of intangible
drilling costs to a co-owner whose proportionate share is significantly less than
100 percent of the property so long as a partnership agreement is the vehicle
for such allocation. However, despite the conclusion reached in the Technical
Advice Memorandum, creating and maintaining capital accounts for each part-
ner in the partnership is advisable.
A generally accepted principle of tax accounting is that expenses are deduc-
tible by a cash basis taxpayer in the year that such payments are made. However,
with respect to prepaid intangible drilling costs, this principle is not always con-
trolling. In a recent Tax Court case, Keller v. Commissioner,32 the court deter-
mined that certain intangible drilling costs are not deductible by cash-basis tax-
payers in the year of payment. In Keller, a cash basis taxpayer acquired a limited
3I.R.C. § 704(b)(2).
T.C.M. (P-H) 79.2 (1982).
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partnership interest in an oil and gas drilling program. The partnership, pur-
suant to I.R.C. section 263(c), elected to expense certain prepaid intangible
drilling costs. The prepayments were for footage and daywork drilling con-
tracts. The deduction of the prepaid intangible drilling costs caused a net
operating loss for the partnership; therefore, the taxpayer reported a loss on
his individual tax return to the extent of his investment in the partnership.
The IRS filed a deficiency notice against the taxpayer based on the
disallowance of more than half the intangible drilling cost deduction claimed
by the partnership. The basis of the Service's disallowance was threefold:
(1) the prepayments of the intangible drilling costs were nondeductible,
refundable deposits; (2) the prepayments lacked a business purpose; and
(3) the deduction of the prepayments in the year of payment would result
in a material distortion of income.
This three-part test for current deductibility of prepaid expenses was basically
the same test utilized by the Service in a prior Review Ruling.33
The Tax Court accepted the Service's argument in principle but did not
concur with the test applied. Instead, the Court fashioned its own two-part
test for determining if a cash-basis taxpayer may properly deduct prepaid in-
tangible drilling costs in the year of payment. The Court's test provided substan-
tially the same as the prior test, except it did not require a business purpose
for the prepayment to be deductible. 4
The effect of the test on the partnership is that only the IDC on the turn-
key contracts are fully deductible. The reason is that only on these contracts
can the partnership's liability not be relieved; thus no distortion results to the
partnership's income if the deduction is taken in full.
Thus, while taxpayers have been given the election to deduct intangible
drilling costs currently, 35 there apparently will be some restrictions when the
election involves prepaid intangible drilling costs. The most important restric-
tion is the application of the distortion of income test3 6 at the partnership level.
This is significant in that it will give the Service broad discretion in determin-
ing what prepaid expenses distort income at the partnership level.
Following the Keller decision, the IRS issued an interesting private letter
ruling. 3 In the letter ruling the Service continued to follow its prior Revenue
"Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144. The Ruling pertained to prepayment of cattle feed and provided
in pertinent part: "First, the expenditure must be a payment . . . rather than a mere deposit; second,
the prepayment must be made for a business purpose and not merely for tax avcidance; and third, the
deduction of such costs in the taxable year of prepayment must not result in a material distortion of income."
Id.
"Under the Tax Court's test, for a prepayment to be deductible (1) it must be a payment rather than
a deposit and; (2) the deduction of such prepayment must not result in a material distortion of income.
"1.R.C. § 263(c).
"I.R.C. § 446(b).
"Ltr. Rul. 8226135.
[Vol. I
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Ruling,3" where it permitted a cash basis taxpayer to deduct prepaid intangible
drilling costs in the year paid when such costs were paid based upon a binding
contract arrived at in an arm's length transaction. This is apparently
distinguishable from Keller in that under the facts of that case the partnership
had the power to alter the contract to such an extent that it could compel a
refund of large portions of the prepaid intangible drilling costs.
Another important development in the area of intangible drilling costs in-
volved offshore exploratory wells. The nature of offshore oil and gas explora-
tion is that wells are drilled from a mobile platform in order to determine the
existence of oil or gas deposits. If a profitable deposit is discovered, a perma-
nent platform replaces the mobile platform and producing wells are drilled.
The IRS's position has been that the cost of exploratory wells is not subject
to the intangible drilling cost election and therefore must be capitalized. The
Service will permit the intangible drilling cost deduction only after a discovery
of a profitable deposit has been made. The Service has not met with much
success in the Tax Court for the court has consistently rejected the position
that IDC's are only deductible when a permanent platform is installed. 9 This
year for the first time a circuit court has accepted the view of the Tax Court
in holding that a taxpayer may elect to deduct as intangible drilling costs those
amounts expended in drilling offshore exploratory wells currently. 0 The Third
Circuit, in rejecting the Service's position, stated, "[o]bviously, such a con-
struction would have the effect of turning the Congressional objective of
rewarding risk-taking on its head."
B. Fee Paid For Oil and Gas Lottery Program
In the recent Tax Court decision, Nicolazzi v. Commissioner," the Court
held that the fee paid for the purpose of securing non-competitor leases on
federal lands was not currently deductible. Because the services provided for
the fee did not involve the management or disposition of an existing property
interest held by the taxpayer, the fee was not deductible as an expense for the
production of income under I.R.C. section 212. The Court found such fee to
be more closely related to a commission than investment advice and therefore
the fee constituted a capital expenditure which must be amortized over the life
of the lease(s) acquired rather than expensed.
C. Advance Royalties
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Engle v.
Commissioner,42 became the first appellate court to decide on the issue of when
"Rev. Rul. 71-252, 1971-1 C.B. 146.
"Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1942), Gates Rubber v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 1456 (1980), Sun Company, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1481 (1980).
"1Sun Company, Inc. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1982).
"4T.C.M, (P-H) 79.7 (1982).
42677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1982).
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royalty owners are entitled to percentage depletion on advance royalties paid
with respect to properties from which no oil or gas was produced in the year
of payments. It has been the IRS's position that royalties do not qualify for
percentage depletion unless there is production from the wells on which such
depletion is claimed. This view was also held by the Tax Court, which looked
to "The express language of section 613A(c) limiting the percentage depletion
deduction to stated quantities of production is so clear that it permits no other
reasonable interpretation. "43 The following year the Seventh Circuit reversed
the Tax Court, finding the statutory language ambiguous." The Court went
on to find that based on the legislative history and the law prior to the enact-
ment of I.R.C. section 613A, no authority existed to impose such a require-
ment. Thus, it seems that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, production is not
a prerequisite for a taxpayer who wishes to take percentage depletion on the
advance royalties he or she has received.
An important point is that the IRS has issued proposed regulations45 which
could have a significant impact upon the payment of advance royalties. The
proposed regulations would permit percentage depletion on advance royalties
only to the extent that such royalties are covered by actual production in the
year of payment. Furthermore, whenever the royalties exceed current produc-
tion, the applicable percentage depletion on such excess is lost forever; the regula-
tions do not allow for a carryover of advance royalties. This is clearly illustrated
by the following example: In 1975, D received his annual payment of a
recoupable advanced royalty of $100x in connection with oil property. Later
in 1975, $60x (of the $100x advanced royalty) was recovered from production
from the property. In 1976, D received another advanced royalty payment of
$100x. Later in 1976, $140x ($40x of the $100x advanced royalty received in
1975 and the $100x advanced royalty received in 1976) was recouped from pro-
duction from the property. Neither advanced royalty payment was attributable
to production in excess of D's depletable oil quantity. D is entitled to percentage
depletion for 1975 only with respect to $60x of the advanced royalty received:
100x dollars X $ 60x
$10Ox
D is entitled to percentage depletion for 1976 with respect to the $1 00x receiv-
ed in 1976. With respect to the $40x received in 1975 not attributable to pro-
duction in 1975, D is not entitled to percentage depletion for any year. Of course,
D is entitled in 1975 to determine the allowable cost depletion with respect to
the entire $100x received in 1975.46
"Engle v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 915 (1981).
'Engle v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1982).
"Prop. Reg. § 1.613A-3(a)(4).
"Prop. Reg. § 1.613A-3(a)(4) example (4).
[Vol. I
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It is, of course, unknown at this point what impact, if any, the Engle deci-
sion will have on the Service's position regarding advanced royalties. However,
the Service is unlikely to reverse its position. Therefore, care should be taken
to equate percentage depletion on advanced royalties with actual production
whenever possible. When this is not possible, be prepared to have the deple-
tion challenged by the Service.
III. TAx SHELTERS
A. Administrative Matters
An estimated 300,000 tax returns are currently under investigation for utiliz-
ing abusive tax shelters. In the past, the IRS has consistently held to a "no
settlement" stance in its review of such litigating vehicles. 7 But as a result of
the backlog of pre-1981 cases under investigation, new policies have been im-
plemented by the IRS in an effort to dispose of the case backlog quickly and
efficiently.
The new approach includes new settlement procedures and a new appeals
conference. Under the new policy, District Offices are permitted to dispose
administratively of pre-1981 cases by allowing tax shelter participants, against
whom deficiencies have been assessed, to execute closing arguments," allow-
ing a deduction only for "out-of-pocket" expenses incurred in the first year.
The remaining credits and deductions originally claimed by the taxpayer will
be disallowed under the "out-of-pocket expense" basis for settlement. According
to the IRS Manual,49 when the taxpayer does not accept the administrative of-
fer during the settlement proceedings, any subsequent deficiency asserted in
a deficiency notice will be based only on meritorious adjustments and will not
reflect the administrative offer.
The new settlement procedures are permanent features of the appeals pro-
cess. The IRS anticipates that the settlement of cases at the lowest possible
level will allow the more efficient use of resources in pursuing more flagrant
pre-1981 cases.
The litigating vehicle cases pending before the Tax Court are also cur-
rently subjected to review for settlement purposes. In order for a case to be
considered for settlement and therefore removed from the Tax Court docket,
the case must either: (1) have some litigating hazard; (2) not set precedent; or
(3) be serious enough to cause problems if left unlitigated. This new procedure
will attempt to resolve the Tax Court's current dilemma of coping with a high
volume of pending tax-shelter cases.
"Cases where the tax benefits have no basis in economic reality or where legal precedent should be
established.
"A closing agreement is a final determination of tax liability that is binding on both the Internal Revenue
Service and the taxpayer.
"Internal Revenue Manual Trans. 1218-132 September 14, 1982.
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New "weapons" have been devised in ERTA and TEFRA to combat the
post-1981 cases involving abusive tax shelters. Section 6700, a TEFRA addi-
tion to the Internal Revenue Code, exclusively details the new penalties and
sanctions to be imposed to reduce the attractiveness of abusive tax shelters.
The new statutory tools enacted under ERTA and TEFRA include:
(1) Civil sanctions against promoters: the imposition of a civil penalty
equal to the lesser of $1,000 or 10%0 of the gross income derived by the
promoter of an abusive tax shelter;
(2) Injunction: a civil action to enjoin a promoter of an abusive tax
shelter from further engaging in such shelter activity; and
(3) Penalties: a) an increase in interest rate for underpayment to 207o;
b) a penalty of 10% to 30% on tax benefits resulting from "gross
valuation overstatement"; 5" and c) the 5%W0 negligence penalty plus
a new penalty tax equal to the interest charge.
The new sanctions and penalties will be imposed according to the pro-
cedural rules detailed in I.R.C. Section 6703.
The IRS has not limited its attack on abusive tax shelters to the audit and
settlement procedures. The attractiveness of many tax shelters has also been
reduced by the imposition of less liberal allowances for deductions and credits
for particular and more abusive tax shelters.
B. Partnerships
One of the most recent abusive tax shelter devices to plague the Tax Courts
involves the taxpayer's participation in a limited partnership. The primary
"business" of the limited partnership is to secure an investment in over-valued,
income producing assets. The most common investment targets for these limited
partnerships have been real estate and motion pictures.
The most attractive characteristic of the limited partnership "tax shelter"
is the potential loss deduction which may result from the partnership's opera-
tions. The potential of a large depreciation deduction and excessive investment
tax credit offer an attractive means of devising a tax-shelter plan.
1. Real Estate Partnership
In the case of Beck v. Commissioner,5 the taxpayers were limited part-
ners in two partnerships. Both partnerships were originally formed for the pur-
pose of purchasing commercial real estate. Each partnership entered into pur-
'"I.R.C. § 6700(b)(1) defines "gross valuation overstatement" as "... any statement as to the value of
any property or services if
(a) the value so stated exceeds 200 percent of the amount determined to be the correct valuation and
(b) the value of such property or services is directly related to the amount of any deducation or credit
allowable under Chapter 1 to any participant."
"1678 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982).
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chase agreements with separate entities to purchase unimproved lots of land.
Each agreement included similar terms: (1) a minimal down payment; (2) a
non-recourse promissory note, secured by an all inclusive deed; and (3) a sum
constituting prepaid interest. The non-recourse loan was the principal source
of financing in each purchase agreement.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Tax Court's decision to
deny the taxpayers a deduction for the interest expense claimed by the tax-
payers under section 163 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The appellate court,
in adopting the Commissioner's position, held that the partnership's tax loss
was not substantiated because: (1) the purchase price of the property far ex-
ceeded the property's fair market value; and (2) the taxpayer was not subject
to personal liability on the underlying non-recourse notes. Therefore, both the
interest deduction and resulting share of the partnership's loss were viewed as
disallowed deductions.
The taxpayers contended that the value of the land, as determined during
the trial proceedings by an expert appraiser, was in error. The court disagreed
with the taxpayers' contention and held that the purchase price of the
unimproved lots was grossly inflated under both agreements.
The appeals court concluded that any interest deduction for the prepaid
interest was not allowable. The Ninth Circuit held that the non-recourse loans
did not qualify as "genuine indebtedness" under section 163 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code since the face amount of the note was in gross excess of the
fair market value of the property. The gross over-valuations were $738,000
and $84,000, respectively. The court stated that the transactions lacked economic
substance. Therefore, no genuine indebtedness existed.
2. Movie Pictures Partnership
The limited partnerships which made their investments in motion pictures
produced a different array of abusive tax shelter problems for the courts to
address. In recent tax shelter cases, the courts have been confronted with issues
such as: (1) excessive asset basis; (2) improper depreciation methods; and (3)
the eligibility for investment tax credit on the tax shelter assets. In the case
of Max E. Wildman,52 the Tax Court reviewed the method of computation
used in determining the depreciation deduction on the tax return of a movie
distributor partnership. The Tax Court held that the depreciable basis for a
movie investment is limited to the fair market value of the movie at the time
of purchase, rather than the actual purchase price of the asset. As a result,
the large depreciation deduction on the movie investment was drastically
reduced.
In Wildman, the taxpayer was a limited partner in a partnershp formed
for the purpose of acquiring and distributing the motion picture "Sea Wolf."
"278 T.C. 67 (1982).
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In 1975, the partnership purchased "Sea Wolf" for $4,000,000. The terms of
the purchase agreement included a down payment of $460,000 cash and a
$3,540,000 non-recourse note.
In 1975, the partnership claimed a depreciation deduction of $1,001,739,
as computed by the income forecast method. The Tax Court held that the part-
nership used the proper depreciation method in calculating the depreciation
deduction. However, the court concluded that the film's income receipts and
the depreciable basis of the motion picture, used by the partnership in the
depreciation formula, were inaccurate.
Since the useful life of a motion picture is difficult to measure, the Tax
Court views the income forecast method as an accurate method of reflecting
net income on a movie venture. The income forecast method matches the current
depreciation deduction with the current income derived from the motion picture.
The actual computation of the income forecast method of depreciation
is as follows:
Current year's income x cost of film = allowable depreciation for
Estimated total income current taxable year.
In Wildman, the Tax Court first addressed the issue of the accuracy of
the net income amount derived from the motion picture in the current year.
The taxpayer argued that the "anticipated" net receipts should be included
in the computation of "net income" of the motion picture. In Wildman, the
partnership had not actually received any income from the movie in 1975.
Therefore, the Tax Court denied a depreciation deduction to the partnership
and to the taxpayer.
The Tax Court also focused on the issue of the proper cost basis of the
motion picture to be used in the computation of the depreciation deduction.
The Tax Court did not allow the taxpayer to include the face amount of the
non-recourse note ($3,540,000) in the depreciable basis of the motion picture.
The court held that where the principal amount of the non-recourse note
unreasonably exceeds the fair market value of the property securing the note,
the non-recourse note will not be includible in the depreciable basis of the asset.
Taxpayers who invest in limited partnerships similar to the partnership
in Wildman should be aware of the Tax Court's strict scrutiny of the large
depreciation deductions taken for such tax shelters. Without the large deprecia-
tion deduction, many tax shelters lose their "tax appeal."
The Tax Court has not allowed the investment tax credit for purchasers
of movie distribution rights. In the case of Charles H. Seigel,13 the Tax Court
"78 T.C. 46 (1982).
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strictly adhered to the literal language of section 48(k). The Tax Court held
that the investment tax credit will be applied only to new motion picture pro-
perty, as was the intent of Congress. As a result of this Tax Court decision,
another favorable characteristic of a-tax shelter scheme is lost.
In Seigel, the taxpayer purchased an interest in a limited partnership that
had purchased the movie "Dead of Night" for $900,000. The terms of the
purchase agreement consisted of $55,000 cash; a $92,500 recourse note; and
a 6% non-recourse note of $752,000.
The taxpayer argued that although the film was used property when
acquired by the partnership, the motion picture was eligible for investment
tax credit. The Commissioner and the Tax Court disagreed with the taxpayer's
interpretation of section 48(k). The court stated that section 48(k)(1)(A) pro-
vides for investment tax credit only for new film or tape and only if the tax-
payer actually has an ownership interest in such property.
Since the taxpayer in Seigel conceded that the partnership had purchased
the interest in the motion picture as "used" property, the Tax Court held that
no investment tax credit was allowed for the purchase of such used property,
per section 48(k).
Taxpayers who invest in tax-shelter assets should be aware of the Tax Court
and the Commissioner's unfavorable view of such plans. The Commissioner
has not been generous in allowing large depreciation deductions or investment
tax credit on tax shelter assets.
IV. DEDUCTIONS
A. Maintaining Home Near Workplace
The Tax Court held in the case of Clarence Bailey54 that the cost of main-
taining a mobile home near a hospital was not a deductible expense by the
hospital lab chief.
The taxpayer was required, as a condition of his employment, to be on
emergency call-back duty every third week of 1976 and 1977. Because he lived
so far from the hospital, Bailey maintained a mobile home near the hospital
so that he would be readily available in case of an emergency. On his 1976
and 1977 tax returns, Bailey claimed deductions for the cost of maintaining
the mobile home during those years. The IRS disallowed the deductions on
the grounds that they were not ordinary and necessry business expenses.
The Tax Court gave judgement for the IRS, holding that lodging expenses
are deductible only when incurred as a moving or travel expense."5 In order
for travel expenses to be deductible, they must be incurred away from home.
'4Clarence Bailey, T.C. Memo 1983-452.
55I.R.C. §§ 62(8), 162(a).
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In analyzing the situation at hand, the court found that Clarence's tax home
was the hospital; therefore, a mobile home parked near the hospital was not
"away from home." Further, the court stated that the choice of maintaining
a residence in an area removed from one's tax home is a personal one and
any expense arising from maintaining a second residence is similarly a personal
expense.
B. Medical Expense
Certain capital improvements to a taxpayer's home which have been
necessitated for medical reasons may be deductible as a medical expense. 6
However, such improvement qualifies as a medical expense only to the extent
that the total expense exceeds the amount by which the permanent improve-
ment increases the value of the property."
The Tax Court's decision in Paul Lerew58 stands for the proposition that
there must be an actual expense which exceeds the increase in value to the pro-
perty. In Lerew, the taxpayer's wife suffered from a degenerative joint disease.
Her physician prescribed daily swimming exercises as therapy, but as her physical
condition was rapidly deteriorating there was not enough time to build a swim-
ming pool at the Lerew home. The Lerews therefore purchase a new home,
complete with a swimming pool, for a total price of $250,000.
The Lerews claimed a medical expense deduction of $15,000. This figure
was arrived at by subtracting the amount by which the pool increased the value
of the house, $5,000 as determined by a real estate broker, from the estimated
cost to build a pool of the same specifications or $20,000.
Agreeing with the IRS, the Tax Court held that no deduction is allowable.
The court reasoned that the Lerews could not show that they had incurred any
expenses in excess of the increase in value of the property since any amount
they might have paid to acquire the pool would represent the increase in value
of the property caused by the presence of the pool.
The court stated that the actual price paid for the pool is the crucial figure,
not the hypothetical cost of construction, since the actual price should be equal
to its fair market value.
C. Educational Expenses
* Expenditures made by a taxpayer to maintain or improve skills required
in his or her business or employment or to meet the express requirements of
his' or her employer or the requirements of law or regulations, imposed as a
condition to retaining his or her salary, status, or employment, are deductible
'61.R.C. § 213.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii).
"Paul Lerew v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 918 (1982).
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as educational expenses. 59 Such expenses are not deductible, however, if in-
curred in undertaking a course of study which will lead to qualification of the
taxpayer for a new trade or business.
This distinction was cited by the Tax Court in two recent cases where a
deduction for educational expense was denied. In the case of Charles A.
Robinson,60 Elaine Robinson worked part-time as a licensed practical nurse
(LPN) while enrolled in a four-year degree program which qualified graduates
to take the State Registered Nurse Examination. The taxpayer contended that
the courses did not qualify her for a new trade or business but served merely
to maintain and improve her nursing skills.
The Tax Court held against the taxpayer. It based its decision on the
Minnesota statutes pertaining to nursing and the job descriptions used at the
hospital where Elaine worked. In both cases registered nursing was viewed as
being significiantly different as an occupation from practical nursing. Registered
Nurse's (RN) have a greater level of authority than LPN's; in all cases the LPN
is subject to supervision by an RN.
The Tax Court applied what it called a "common-sense" approach in deter-
mining that an Air Force pilot's training for civilian flight engineer qualifica-
tion did indeed lead to qualification of the taxpayer for a new trade or business,
and thus the expenses incurred in such training were not deductible.
In the case of Larry J. Brandt," Brandt was a pilot in the Air Force who
took a course to prepare for the Federal Aviation Administration's written exam
for flight engineers. Brandt argued that a greater knowledge of the work of
the flight engineer was helpful to him in his work as a pilot. But the court
found that the flight engineer's responsibility is to keep the plane's engines in
operational condition, whereas the pilot is responsible for flying the plane.
D. Home Office Expense
In John W. Green, 62 the taxpayer was allowed a deduction for office-at-
home expenses where the office was used only to receive telephone calls after
office hours. Deductions for office-at-home expenses are generally barred by
the Code63 with certain exceptions. The taxpayer in Green tried to get around
the general rule by contending that his at-home office was used on a regular
basis as (1) the taxpayer's principal place of business, or (2) a place of business
used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer
in the normal course of his trade or business." ' The Tax Court rejected the
"Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
"Charles A. Robinson, 78 T.C. 37 (1982).
"Larry J. Brandt, T.C. Memo 1982-180.
6278 T.C. 30 (1982).
11I.R.C. § 280A.
6"I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1).
1983]
17
Briner: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1982
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
deduction based on the first exception, but allowed the deduction under the
second.
John Green's employer provided him with an office where he spent 20%/o
of his workday. The remainder of his eight-hour workday was spent outside
of this office at various job sites and in meetings with contractors and business
associates. As an account executive for a condominium development firm, the
taxpayer was required (as a condition of his employment) to receive telephone
calls from clients at his home after his regular business hours. These calls came
from individuals, many of whom were unable to contact Green during office
hours. The calls averaged 2 hours per night, five nights a week. The tax-
payer also used his office-at-home to return calls in response to messages received
by his secretary during the day.
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that since he spent equal
amounts of time in his company and home offices, both should qualify as his
principal place of business. Stating that the number of hours of use was not
the determinative factor, the court responded that there can be only one prin-
cipal place of business for a particular business. The court examined the facts
of the case and in determining which office was the principal place of business
applied the test of which office is the "focal" point of the taxpayer's business.
The court held that the company's office was the principal place of business.
The Tax Court did, however, accept the taxpayer's second contention that
his home office was used to meet clients. The Court took into consideration
the following factors in determining whether a telephone call constitutes a
"meeting or dealing" by a client or customer: (1) the taxpayer was required
(as a condition of his employment) to take calls from clients in the evenings;
(2) the calls were received on a regular basis; (3) Green used one room of his
house exclusively for taking the calls and keeping files and information used
in his business; (4) the calls were client-initiated; and (5) taking the calls at home
was essential to his employer's condominium-management business, as well
as to the taxpayer's performance of his duties.
It should be noted that there were three dissenting opinions in this case,
with seven judges who felt that the deduction should be disallowed. The majority
emphasized that telephone contacts will not satisfy the statutory requirements
in all cases. The court went further in stating that in most situations the op-
posite conclusion will probably be reached and the physical presence of the
patient, client, or customer will probably be required.
E. Retirement Community Entrance Fee
In the case of Helen W. Smith,65 the Tax Court held that only that por-
tion of a one-time entrance fee to a retirement community which is applicable
6579 T.C. 19 (1982).
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to the right to care at an adjacent convalescent center is deductible as a medical
expense.
In Smith, the taxpayer paid a $20,000 entrance fee to a retirement com-
munity for her parents who were her dependents for tax purposes. The retire-
ment community provided no direct medical services to the residents. Residents
were required to be ambulatory and able to care for themselves. -An exception
occurred where two persons resided in the sane apartment. In that case, one
of the persons was required to be self-sufficient and capable of caring for the
other. However, the residents were entitled to a certain number of free days
at the convalescent center within a few hundred yards of the retirement
community.
The taxpayer deducted the $20,000 entrance fee on her 1976 return as a
medical expense. The IRS disallowed all of the deduction except for that por-
tion of the fee which was allocable to the medical insurance provided by the
retirement community.
The Tax Court agreed with the Service: an entrance fee paid to a retire-
ment community which does not provide medical or nursing care is not a deduc-
tible medical expense. But the Court went further to hold that the portion of
the fee which provided for free days of care at the adjacent convalescent center
was deductible as medical expense in the year paid.
The Court held that the intent of section 21366 is to allow a deduction
for expenses incurred and paid in a taxable year. 67 Since the obligation to pay
the fee was incurred when the residency agreement was entered into, the legal
obligation to pay existed at that time also, and not in future years when such
services would be received.68
The Smith case seems to indicate that the expenses for costs of maintenance
at an institution other than a hospital where no direct medical services are pro-
vided to the residents will not be deductible as a medical expense.
F. Illegal Insurance Premium Discounts
Under section 162(c)(2),6 9 a trade or business expense deduction for
payments is disallowed if such payment is illegal under State law. However,
the section is qualified by the words, "but only if such state law is generally
enforced." The Internal Revenue Service bears the burden of proof in show-
ing that the payments are illegal.
Section 162(c)(2) qualifies the general rule of section 162(a), which allows
the taxpayer to deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incur-
6I.R.C. § 213.
67Bassett v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 619 (1956).
1179 T.C. at 168.
6979 T.C. 19 (1982).
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red during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."
In the case of John W. Custis and Eleanor H. Custis0 the taxpayers were
licensed insurance agents in the State of Ohio. The Custises sold life insurance
to individuals under an arrangement whereby the first-year premiums were paid
by the Custises themselves. These payments were treated as "returns and
allowances" against gross receipts on the taxpayers' returns. At that time, it
was generally unlawful for insurance agents in Ohio to pay or rebate insurance
premiums on the life of an insured as an inducement to purchase insurance.II
The IRS determined deficiencies in the taxpayers' federal income taxes
for the taxable years of 1973, 1974 and 1975, contending that the deductions
for "returns and allowances" against gross receipts were not deductible business
expenses, and in actuality were illegal payments made in violation of a "generally
enforced" state statute. The Commissioner also questioned business travel and
entertainment expenses claimed by the taxpayers.
The decision in the Custis case, as well as in several prior cases dealing
with the same issue seem to turn on the definition of the term "generally en-
forced" as it is used in seciton 162(c)(2).
The court in Custis stated that there clearly seemed to be a violation of
the Ohio law but went on to hold that the Service had failed to show by clear
and convincing evidence that the Ohio statute was generally enforced during
the years in question. In its opinion the court cited Boucher v. Commissioner 2
as the only case which expressly dealt with the question of whether a state statute
was generally enforced within the meaning of section 162(c)(2).
The facts of Boucher are similar to those presented in Custis. Boucher
dealt with a Washington state insurance statute which was quite similar to the
Ohio statute. The Tax Court in Boucher held that the Washington statute was
generally enforced even though there were no attempts made to discover viola-
tions of the statute and no actions were taken over a twenty year period as
to actual violations.
The facts of Custis reveal that the IRS contacted the Ohio Department
of Insurance regarding Custis' premium rebating activities. In response to the
IRS inquiry, a representative of the Department of Insurance prepared an affi-
davit in which he stated that the Department would investigate and take whatever
administrative action necessary.
At the time of the Tax Court trial, the Department of Insurance had taken
no official action against Custis. The Tax Court held that the rebate statute
was not generally enforced and thus the premium rebates were deductible. The
'"I.R.C. § 213.
"Bassett v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 619 (1956).
"179 T.C. at 168.
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court 1ointed out that there had been no formal action taken as a result of
the statute since 1970. The court went further to state that the IRS had failed
to sustain the burden of proof in that the evidence offered by the Service in
support of its position was the testimony of the Department of Insurance
representative expressing an interest in copies of certain documents. In fact,
the Department of Insurance representative revealed in his testimony that up
until the trial he was unaware of the name of the insurance company which
Custis represented.
The distinction between Custis and Boucher lies in the evidence offered
by the IRS in support of its position. In Boucher, the IRS showed that the
Washington Insurance Commission issued advisory letters on a routine basis
as to whether certain practices were in violation of the anti-rebate statute.
Evidence was also offered that the lack of prosecution was a result of there
being few, if any, violations of the law. In Custis neither of the above factors
was present.
G Casualty Loss Deducation
In the case of Hills vs. Commissioner,7 the Eleventh Circuit District Court
of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether a voluntary election not to file an
insurance claim for a theft loss precludes a casualty loss deduction under I.R.C.
section 165. The Eleventh Circuit diverged from prior judicial treatment and
upheld the Tax Court's findings which permit a taxpayer to claim the deduc-
tion for a casualty loss even though the taxpayer had not sought insurance reim-
bursement for the loss.
The taxpayers in the Hills case were victims of a theft loss of $760.00.
The taxpayers were insured for the loss under their insurance policy. However,
they elected not to claim the loss under the insurance policy, but rather to claim
a casualty loss deduction on their federal income tax return in the year of the loss.
The Commissioner contended that a two-prong test must be applied in
section 165 cases: (1) whether there had been a loss; and (2) if a loss was deter-
mined, whether the loss had been compensated by insurance or otherwise.
It was the Commissioner's argument in the Hills case that since all
reasonable possibilities of recompense were not pursued by the taxpayers, no
deductible loss was realized. The Commissioner further contended that since
the taxpayers did not seek insurance reimbursement the loss was caused by the
taxpayers' election not to file an insurance claim. Therefore, the IRS held the
position that the loss did not qualify as a section 165 deductible loss.
The Eleventh Circuit did not agree with the Commissioner's position. The
court relied on the plain language of section 165(a) and applied the two-prong
test as provided in this section of the Internal Revenue Code.
"3691 F.2d 997 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Section 165(a) states that a deduction is allowed for any "loss . . .not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise." The two-tier test encompassed
in this statute is (1) whether there was a loss and (2) whether the loss was com-
pensated for by insurance or otherwise. The Eleventh Circuit Court interpreted
this two-tier test literally and concluded that the mere fact that a loss is covered
under an insurance policy does not automatically disallow a loss deduction under
section 165 if the taxpayer/insured elects not to seek insurance reimbursement
for the loss suffered.
The Hills situation is directly addressed by section 165(c)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. This section pertains to personal losses of property, including
losses resulting from theft. As a result of the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
in the Hills case, a deduction is allowed on a taxpayer's income tax return even
though no insurance reimbursement was sought by the taxpayer to cover the
theft loss.
This issue of whether failure to claim insurance reimbursement bars a
deduction has surfaced in areas other than casualty losses. A Private Letter
Ruling74 addressed the issue of the deductibility of medical expenses where the
taxpayer had not filed a claim for insurance reimbursement. The IRS's posi-
tion, as detailed in the 1981 Letter Ruling, states that no deduction is permitted
under this factual situation."'
Taxpayers should be keenly aware of whether other courts follow the
Eleventh Circuit decision. If a trend develops, the taxpayer may be relieved
of the obligation to seek insurance reimbursement for losses prior to claiming
a deduction on the federal tax return.
V. CORPORATIONS
A. Preferred Stock - Section 306
When a shareholder sells or redeems section 306 stock, ordinarily income
will result from such transactions.7 6 As defined by the Code, section 306 stock
is certain stock issued as a stock dividend or stock issued in a reorganization,
or stock issued in a section 351 incorporation transfer. 7  Stock is classified as
section 306 stock in order to prevent "preferred stock bail-outs" of corporate
earnings at capital gains rates.
In the case of a tax-free reorganization, stock received is section 306 stock
if (1) it is stock other than common stock and (2) the effect of the transaction
is substantially the same as a stock dividend. 78 The IRS has held that voting
"Ltr. Rul. 8102010.
"/d.
'61.R.C. § 306.
"I.R.C. § 351.
"I.R.C. § 306(c)(B).
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preferred shares-are "stock other than common" if they are limited to a maxi-
mum amount as to dividends or liquidation proceeds. 9 In a new ruling, the
Service holds that where a shareholder, in the course of a recapitalization, ex-
changes all of his or her shares of common for voting-preferred stock, and
shortly thereafter buys non-voting common shares in the same corporation,
the voting preferred shares are section 306 stock.8
The new ruling was issued in response to the following situation. A cor-
poration undergoing a recapitalization which qualified as a tax-free reorganiza-
tion, had 100 shares of common stock outstanding twenty shares of which were
owned by shareholder W. Under the reorganization, all the shareholders sur-
rendered their old common shares in exchange for new voting-preffered shares.
The new preferred shares were limited and preferred as to dividends and also had
a fixed liquidation preference. Shareholder W received fifteen shares of the
preferred while other shareholders received a total of eighty shares. A short
time later, shareholder Wbought ten new shares of non-voting common stock
from the corporation. These shares made up the entire common stock of the
corporation and were purchased for half of their value.
All of the preferred stock received by shareholder Wwas deemed section
306 stock by the IRS. The Service concluded that the common-for-preferred
exchange, taken together with the later purchase of the ten shares of common,
enabled the shareholder to ball out earnings by selling preferred stock while
still maintaining an.equity position.
In determining the tax consequences of the exchange, the IRS said that
it would treat the transactions as if shareholder Whad exchanged fifteen shares
of old common stock for the new preferred stock and had exchanged the re-
maining five shares of old common plus cash for the ten shares of new com-
mon. Further, the Service concluded that the new common would be treated
as the old common in determining the section 306 status of the preferred shares.
As such, the fifteen shares of new preferred were deemed section 306 stock.
B. Corporate Recapitalization
In 1982, the IRS announced that it will not issue advance rulings as to
whether a transaction is a Type E reorganization under I.R.C. section
368(a)(1)(E) or a transaction that also qualifies under I.R.C. section 1036.81
Section 1036 permits the exchange, without the recognition of gain or loss of
common stock for common stock, or of preferred stock for preferred stock,
in the same corporation. 2
"Rev. Rul. 79-163, 1979 - 131 C.B.
"Rev. Rul. 82-191, 1982 - 46 I.R.B. 11.
"Rev. Proc. 82-30, 1982-19 I.R.B. The new Revenue Procedure is effective for all ruling requests made
after April 30, 1982.
2Treas. Reg. § 1.1036-1.
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Gerald G. Portney, Associated Chief Counsel (Technical) for the IRS,
stated that advance ruling requests were made for "insurance" reasons; i.e.,
to know that certain intended tax consequences will in fact be achieved. Although
the IRS has not barred other types of advance "insurance" rulings, it has
apparently singled out the recapitalization rulings for two reasons: first, because
there has been an extremely large number of requests for advance rulings in
this area; and, second, because the Service seems to consider the law to be settled
in this area. Portney noted that there are Treasury Regulations, as well as some
twenty-five published Revenue Rulings on the subject of recapitalizations. Any
future developments in the area of recapitalizations will be addressed in published
Revenue Rulings, according to Portney.
There will be one exception to the new bar on advance rulings for cor-
porate recapitalizations. Advance rulings will continue to be issued if the
recapitalization is an integral part of a larger transaction and it is impossible
to determine the tax consequences of the larger transaction without a making
determination with regardd to the recapitalization.
VII. INTEREST FREE LOANS
In Baker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 the Second Circuit
affirmed an earlier decision of the Tax Court which held that the taxpayer did
not realize taxable income from interest free loans received from a corpora-
tion of which he was president and shareholder. The Second Circuit, adhering
to the principle of stare decisis followed the Dean line of decisions.8 4 The IRS
has been attempting to overrule Dean since 1973 but has not succeeded either
before the Tax Court or before any reviewing court of appeals. 5 However,
the IRS found a friendly ear in the Court of Claims in Hardee v. U.S."
W. L. Hardee and his wife were the principal shareholders, with Hardee
as president, of approximately 95qo of Sea Garden Sales Company, Inc., a
closely-held corporation engaged in several business activities including marine,
industrial and municipal supplies, farming and ranching, and the operation
of a fleet of deep-sea shrimp trawlers.
Hardee's practice of borrowing began in the 1950's. He maintained a run-
ning loan amount with Sea Garden, borrowing money as needed and putting
money back when able to do so. The borrowings were evidenced by promissory
notes with no obligation to pay any interest. By the end of 1972, Hardee's in-
83677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982).
"Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
"The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have affirmed the Tax Court's adherence to Dean: Greenspun
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Commissioner, 40
T.C.M. (CCH) 1324 (1980), aff'd, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Suttle v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. (P-H)
1638 (1978), aff'd, 625 F2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 531 (1979),
aff'd, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
8682-2 U.S. Tax Cases 9459 (Ct. C1. 1982).
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debtedness to Sea Garden was approximately $503,000; at the end of 1974 he
owed $474,000.87
The Commissioner asserted that as a result of these loans Hardee receiv-
ed an economic benefit measured by the interest he would have been required
to pay had he obtained the loans in an arm's length transaction. The IRS com-
puted the daily balance of Hardee's indebtedness to Sea Garden and applied
a 7 percent interest factor to derive an interest-not-charged figure. The Com-
missioner assessed a deficiency of $24,926 for 1973 and $24,675 for 1974.8'
During these same years, Hardee held $500,000 worth of tax-exempt municipal
bonds, but the questions arising from these investments was held moot by the
decision.
The Tax Court's and circuit court's rationale in the Dean case is that if
taxpayers were to have additional income on the imputed interest of an interest-
free loan, there would not be any taxable income because of a corresponding
deduction of the imputed interest under I.R.C. section 163(a). 9
The Court of Claims in Hardee turned to the express language of section
163(a). It held that the deduction is conditioned on the actual payment or accural
of interest within the taxable year. Since the loans were interest-free there was
no payment of interest and therefore no deduction.
The Court of Claims looked at Commissioner v. National Alfalfa
Dehydrating0 where the Supreme Court said that the "propriety of a deduc-
tion does not turn upon general equitable considerations, such as a demonstra-
tion of effective economic and practical equivalence. Rather, it depends upon
legislative grace; and only where there is clear provision in the Code can any
particular deduction be allowed." 91 The Court of Claims adhered to the prin-
ciple in NationalAlfalfa that tax consequences be determined according to the
facts as they stand and not according to facts that could have been.92 The court
said that "had Mr. Hardee's loans been structured differently by giving him
first the interest in cash and the loans thereafter that he then might have been
allowed a deduction." 93 Since Congress had not provided for this in the Code
there should be no deduction since there was no actual interest paid." 9 '
This decision has yet to be reviewed by the full Court of Claims. If the
full Court determines that Hardee was decided properly, taxpayers will be well
87Id.
38Id.
"
9I.R.C. § 163(a) provides for the deduction of "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on
indebtedness."
90417 U.S. 134 (1974).
11417 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1974).
982-2 U.S. Tax Cases 9459 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
93Id.
94Id.
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advised to pursue the issue in the Tax Court. A conflict between circuit courts
often leads to a Supreme Court review, however, the Court may wait for Con-
gressional resolution of the conflict.
The Eleventh Circuit recently held in Dickman v. Commissioner" that tax-
able gifts result when lenders make interest-free loans to a relative and a closely-
held corporation. This decision is contradictory to the Seventh Circuit's posi-
tion in Crown v. Commissioner.96 Crown held that interest-free loans were not
gifts.
Paul B. Dickman, deceased, his wife Esther, their son Lyle and his family
owned Artesian Farm, Inc., a Florida corporation. In the years 1971 to 1976
Paul and Esther loaned money interest-free to Lyle and Artesian. The Com-
missioner determined that the loans resulted in taxable gifts and assessed defi-
ciencies against Esther and Paul. The Tax Court ruled that all loans were on
a demand basis and followed the Crown decision. The Eleventh Circuit re-
jected Crown outright and reversed, making no distinction between "term"
and "demand loans."
Crown was justified on the difference between "term" and "demand
notes." Non-interest-bearing term notes used to secure a loan have been held
to be bargained-for exchanges requiring gift taxation." Crown and the earlier
case Johnson98 held that an owner is free to use or not to use his or her pro-
perty, and there are no tax implications from the failure of an owner to make
the highest and best use of such property. The taxpayer has no right to in-
terest, and since the loans are on a demand basis the taxpayer does not give
up complete control over the property; therefore, there are no gift tax conse-
quences. The Eleventh Circuit said these courts missed the point; that if an
owner does transfer property for less than full consideration, that does con-
sistute a taxable gift. 99
The Eleventh Circuit argued that the reach of the gift tax provisions should
be broadly interpreted.100 The court cites several occasions where the Supreme
Court has indicated this broad reading. '01 The court also said this was evidenced
by the Congressoinal Committee Reports and by the Treasury Regulations.'0 2
"Dickman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 690 F.2d 812 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
"Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
"Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953); Estate of Berkman v. Commissioner 387 T.C.M. (CCH)
183 (1979).
"Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tax 1966).
"690 F.2d 817.
"'°I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1); I.R.C. § 2511(a); I.R.C. § 2512(b).
'"Commissioner v. Wemyess, 324 U.S. 303 (1954); Smith v. Shaughmessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943); Bobinette
v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
1'0H. REP. No. 72-708, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. 27-28 (1932); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c).
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The Eleventh Circuit determined that the right to use money is property
for tax purposes." 3 The court cited several decisions what have held that the
right to use property for a predetermined, definite period of time constitutes
property for tax purposes.10 4
The Commissioner argued that the right to use thousands of interest-free
dollars transferred without consideration to Lyle and Artesian is encompassed
within the gift tax statute. He pointed out that Lyle and Artesian received the
beneficial enjoyment of the transferred property which under the Treasury
Regulations constituted a taxable gift to the extent of that right." 5
The Treasury Regulations provide that in the case of a transfer of pro-
perty which is an incomplete gift because the donor retains dominion and con-
trol, the receipt of "income or other enjoyment of the transferred property
by the transferee" during the period before the gift is complete "constitutes
a gift of such income or of such other enjoyment taxable as of the calendar
quarter . . . of its receipt."'0 6
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the right to use money is property
for tax purposes.0 3 The court cited several decisions which have held that the
tory to the Seventh Circuits' Crown position and will probably warrant a
Supreme Court review of the interest-free loan, gift tax consequences area.
10690 F.2d 815.
'"Threlfall v. U.S., 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D.Wis. 1969); Allen v. Commissioner 57 T.C. 12 (1971);
Thriftmart, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 598 (1973); Sullivan v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
101690 F.2d 812 at 815.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f).
107690 F.2d 812 at 819.
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